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Misrecognition in the making of a state: Ghana’s international relations 
under Kwame Nkrumah1 
 
Abstract 
This paper draws on a Kleinian psychoanalytic reading of Hegel’s theory of 
the struggle for recognition to explore the role of international 
misrecognition in the creation of state subjectivity. It focuses on Ghana’s 
early years, when international relations were powerfully conceptualised 
and used by Kwame Nkrumah in his bid to bring coherence to a fragile 
infant state. Nkrumah attempted to create separation and independence 
from the West on the one hand, and intimacy with a unified Africa on the 
other. By creating juxtapositions between Ghana and these idealised 
international others, he was able to create a fantasy of a coherent state, 
built on a fundamental misrecognition of the wider world. As the fantasy 
bumped up against the realities of Ghana’s failing economy, fractured social 
structures and complex international relationships, it foundered, causing 
alienation and despair. I argue that the failure of this early fantasy was the 
start of Ghana’s quest to begin processes of individuation and subjectivity, 
and that its undoing was an inevitable part of the early stages of 
misrecognition, laying the way for more grounded struggles for recognition 
and the development of a more complex state-subjectivity.  
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1 This article has benefitted enormously from the help and insights of the editors 
and other contributors to this special issue, and the editors and anonymous 
reviewers of the Review of International Studies. I would like to thank them, and 
also members of the departments of Politics at SOAS and Royal Holloway where 
early versions of this paper were presented. 
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What does a new state feel like? In a powerful passage of his book Africa must 
Unite, Kwame Nkrumah explains what he felt on becoming leader of independent 
Ghana in 1957, describing the ‘emptiness that colonialism has left’.2 He writes 
about how he and his colleagues walked through Christiansborg Castle, the 
British governor’s former residence:  
 
Not a rag, not a book was to be found; not a piece of paper; not a single 
reminder that for very many years the colonial administration had had its 
centre there. That complete denudation seemed like a line drawn across 
our continuity. It was as though there had been a definite intention to cut 
off all links between the past and present which could help us in finding our 
bearings.3  
 
Nkrumah’s feelings chime with Ki-Zerbo’s description of newly independent 
African states sitting on top of countries in which people were disconnected from 
themselves, ‘a sort of shipwreck towed along by the thread of a history made and 
written by the European conquerors’.4 Economic structures, Nkrumah wrote, 
had been designed to feed Britain’s colonial interests, and contained ‘a kind of 
                                                        
2 Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite (London: Panaf Books, 1998), p. xv. 
3 Nkrumah (1998) p. xiv. 
4 Joseph Ki-Zerbo ‘African personality and the new African society’ in American 
Society of African Culture (ed) Pan-Africanism Reconsidered (Berkley: University 
of California Press, 1962) pp. 267-82, p. 271. 
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Alice in Wonderland craziness about them’.5 The education system had trained 
people to be ‘inferior copies of Englishmen, caricatures to be laughed at with our 
pretensions to British bourgeois gentility, our grammatical faultiness and 
distorted standards betraying us at every turn. We were neither fish nor fowl’.6 
 
As African states were ‘born’ – granted independence – from the late 1950s 
onwards, they formed new political units, replacing both pre-colonial and 
colonial political entities. Ghana had no territorial form to return to and it 
needed a new name to replace the colonial ‘Gold Coast’. Its physical boundaries 
and state structures had been established through colonial conquest and were an 
alien legacy for most Africans. Foreign rule had left Africans with a ‘crisis of 
conscience’, a ‘loss of identity’.7 Now they were meant to become properly 
African states, a conception that had shallow political resonance for many 
Africans who were more inclined to think of themselves in ethnic or regional 
terms8 and faced the enormous challenge of how to develop an African form of 
                                                        
5 Nkrumah (1998) p. 27. 
6 Nkrumah (1998) p. 49. 
7 Kwame Nkrumah, Consciencism (London: Panaf Books, 1964), cited and 
discussed by Ama Biney, The Political and Social Thought of Kwame Nkrumah 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). 
8 There’s a wide literature on this topic. For a sense of the range and scale of the 
topic, see for example Immanuel Wallerstein, ‘Ethnicity and National Integration 
in West Africa’, Cahiers d'Études Africaines, 1:3, 1960, pp. 129-39; M. A. 
Mohamed and John Markakis, Ethnicity and the State in Eastern Africa (Uppsala: 
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subjectivity. The new states carried plenty of baggage, but they needed to 
establish themselves and their personalities afresh. 
 
Nkrumah, who became prime minister of Ghana at independence in 1957, 
describes Ghana as empty, crazy and alienated from itself, not properly self-
conscious and unsure how to act. To make matters more difficult, it was the first 
African state to come into existence through independence. If it lacked self-
consciousness, it also lacked an immediate other with which to engage and 
against which to fashion itself. How could it begin to find or make this other? 
 
In this article, I use Hegel’s struggle for recognition and Klein’s psychoanalytic 
theory to explore the way states realise themselves through external 
relationships. This is to take up Epstein, Lindemann and Sending’s point that 
‘self-other interactions... are what makes the self into a self’.9 In Hegelian terms, 
newly-born Ghana might be described as a pre-subject, as yet it had not realised 
itself as a state. In Kleinian terms it appeared to be in a schizoid-paranoid 
condition, internally fragmented, lacking an ‘ego’ by which to organise its 
selfhood. For both Hegel and Klein, the creation of coherent selfhood comes 
                                                                                                                                                              
Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1998); Peter Vale, Security and Politics in South Africa: 
the regional dimension (Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, 2003); and 
Joshua Forrest, Subnationalism in Africa: ethnicity, alliances, and politics 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004). 
9 Charlotte Epstein, Thomas Lindemann & Ole Jacob Sending, ‘Misrecognition in 
World Politics’ (framing paper for this SI, 2018), p. XX. 
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about through relationships; only by engaging with others beyond can it 
understand itself. Hegel describes such processes as struggles for recognition 
and Klein understands them through object-relations theory. I use a Kleinian 
reading of Hegel as a model for explaining the mechanics of state-formation and 
the Ghanaian example to think through what it takes to establish statehood ‘from 
scratch’.10 In it, Klein fleshes out Hegel’s mechanics of recognition at the 
individual level in a way that highlights a consistency of ideas between the two; 
applying a Kleinian reading of recognition to the national/international level 
takes her ideas well beyond her comfort zone of the consulting room. 
 
I understand ‘statehood’ or ‘state-subjectivity’ as analogous to selfhood or self-
consciousness. It is made up both of a sense of self – the degree to which the 
state can embody the identity and aspirations of its population – and its ability to 
act, its agency. Statehood is therefore both a gathering together and making 
sense of internal objects on the domestic level, and the capacity to exercise 
agency beyond itself, on the international level. Nkrumah, as we shall see, did 
                                                        
10 Nkrumah’s powerful picture of starting from scratch is a little disingenuous. 
Ghana’s independence was not an overnight revolution but 'achieved by staged 
constitutional steps’, in which he was a key player, heading a transitional 
government from 1951. David Apter: ‘Nkrumah, Charisma and the Coup’ 
Daedalus 97:3, 1968, pp. 757-92; p. 757. Nonetheless, his description of a 
dramatically disruptive and historically unprecedented transformation, moving 
from identityless-ness and conscienceless-ness to viable new state is persuasive. 
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both these things as he attempted to make the Ghanaian state, and each fed upon 
the other. 
 
It has puzzled scholars of Ghanaian and African politics that the man who 
pursued pan-Africanism so vigorously, who set out to make a United States of 
Africa, ended up producing the template for a group of independent states, which 
have largely been unable to establish collective political and economic 
groupings.11 I argue here that the emergence of Ghanaian nationalism and sense 
of statehood happened because of Nkrumah's pursuit of pan-Africanism, not in 
spite of it. The Ghanaian state emerged as an individual through its international 
relationships, and in particular through the way Nkrumah forged Ghana by 
‘splitting’ its external others into a good Africa which could be perfectly 
identified with, and a bad West which could be completely rejected. Despite 
historical accounts which suggest that both relationships were more complex 
than Nkrumah painted them, his ideas of a dichotomised world were popular 
and powerful. I show how he created these idealised others through processes of 
misrecognition to make sense of a fledgling nation that barely knew what it was.  
 
My argument is that misrecognition in IR is not only inescapable (as others in 
this SI argue), but is necessary to achieve a sense of stability during periods of 
                                                        
11 David Birmingham, Kwame Nkrumah: the father of African nationalism, 
revised edition (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1998); David E. Apter and James 
S. Coleman, ‘Pan-Africanism or nationalism in Africa’, American Society of 
African Culture (1962), pp. 81–115. 
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uncertainty. Nkrumah created a set of international relationships that were 
rooted in misrecognition: his paintings of an idealised pan-Africa and a 
demonised West were partly imagined, certainly flattened and idealised, 
projected onto the wider world as a way to resolve internal ambiguity. Yet 
despite their roots in fantasy, these relationships were productive in establishing 
a fragile sense of statehood. Only once a degree of self-realisation had been 
created, could the state begin to develop more mature international 
relationships characterised by ambiguity and demanding a more robust 
selfhood. By that time, Nkrumah had outlived his role. Thus my chief concern in 
this article is intra-subjectivity and how it begins to be built on inter-subjectivity. 
The argument builds on Epstein’s discussion of Hegel’s argument that the 
formation of the subject is ‘steeped in concrete experiences’.12 It shares many of 
the preoccupations found in the other contributions to this SI – with agency13, 
sovereignty14 and the instability of recognition15 – but while they tend to focus 
                                                        
12 Charlotte Epstein ‘Recognition Theory’s Owl: theorising misrecognition with 
Hegel and Lacan’ (this SI, 2018). 
13 Miranda Holm and Ole Jacob Sending ‘States before Relations: institutionalised 
misrecognition and the performance of statehood’ (this SI, 2018); Thomas 
Lindemann ‘Agency, (Mis)Recognition in International Violence: the case of 
French Jihadism’ (this SI, 2018) 
14 Catarina Kinnvall and Svensson ‘Misrecognition and the Indian State: the 
desire for sovereign agency’ (this SI, 2018); Ayse Zarakol ‘Sovereign Equality as 
Misrecognition’ (this SI, 2018); 
15 Kinnvall and Svensson (this SI, 2018); Epstein (this SI, 2018). 
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on the inter-subjectivity part of the Hegelian argument,16 mine remains largely at 
the intra-subjective level. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. First, I explain my theoretical framework in more 
detail, showing how a Kleinian approach to Hegel gives us a sharper analytical 
handle on understanding the role of recognition and misrecognition in the 
shaping of individual subjectivity. I outline three stages: first, manic-schizoid or 
pre-cognition/subjectivity; second, splitting and idealisation or misrecognition; 
and third, acknowledgement of misrecognition and the possibility for 
recognition. The rest of the article explores these three stages in the early life of 
Ghana, describing first, Ghana’s fragile condition at independence; second, its 
early, idealised international relationships; and third, the replacement of these 
with more complex relationships.17  
                                                        
16 Tanya Aalberts ‘Misrecognition and the Aporia of the Family of Nations’ (this 
SI, 2018); Holm and Sending (this SI, 2018); Lindemann (this SI, 2018). 
17 I am not a historian of Ghana and I draw therefore on the historical accounts of 
others to support my broader theoretical and methodological argument. Many of 
these accounts fit within a complex ideological topography. Ghana, the first 
African country to become independent, was a magnet for an early generation of 
Africanist scholars who, as Jeffrey Ahlman writes in a recent account of the 
period, were drawn into an ideological ‘tug-of-war’ cast either as a ‘struggle 
between the “modern and the “traditional”, in the case of modernization-minded 
figures… or as one of revolutionary versus reactionary’. (Jeffrey S Ahlman Living 












A Kleinian reading of recognition18 
                                                                                                                                                              
University Press, 2017) p. 10). Academic accounts always fall within the 
particular ideological bent of their authors, but those of this period of early 
African independence are particularly ideological – indeed, many academics 
became part of the political landscape themselves, acting as advisors or 
sympathetic cheerleaders for Nkrumah and the Convention People’s Party (CPP). 
It is interesting in the context of the argument presented in this article that 
Ghanaian politics was at the time seen as so clearly dichotomised – and this is a 
trend that continues, notably with Ali Mazrui’s description of ‘positive’ and 
‘negative’ Nkrumahism. Ali Mazrui Nkrumah’s legacy and Africa’s triple heritage 
between globalisation and counter-terrorism (Accra, 2004). 
18 Unlike her contemporary, Jacques Lacan, Klein does not draw on Hegel and 
neither as far as I am aware, do any of her followers. The connections between 
Klein and Hegel made in this article are mine and build on earlier work: Julia 
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Recognition, understood within a Kleinian reading of Hegel, is fractious and 
unstable, built on a struggle between desires for oneness with and separation 
from an other. Recognition is thus already underpinned by inherent instability, 
rooted in mutual dependence and an acknowledgement of radical separation. 
When Epstein et al talk of the inevitable failure of struggles for recognition,19 I 
see this failure stemming from the impossibility of achieving anything more than 
glimpses of recognition, snatched moments of a precarious balance between two 
inevitably contradictory conditions. Hegel captures the fraught nature of this 
ongoing process of seeking recognition in his discussion of the way in which 
relationships of love within the family – the prototype of all relationships – 
continue to be shaped by dialectically opposed desires of wanting to be the other 
and asserting radical separation from the other.  
                                                                                                                                                              
Gallagher, Zimbabwe’s International Relations: fantasy and reality in the making 
of the state (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2017); Julia Gallagher, 
‘Creating a State: a Kleinian reading of recognition in Zimbabwe’s regional 
relationships’, European Journal of International Relations: DOI: 
10.1177/1354066115588204, 2015, pp. 1-24. In fact, Klein’s work has rarely 
been applied to political and social questions, possibly because she did virtually 
nothing in these directions herself, choosing to keep her ideas in their clinical 
context. For two notable exceptions see: Hanna Segal, Psychoanalysis, Literature 
and War: papers 1972-1995 (Abingdon: Routledge, 1997); C. Fred Alford, 
Melanie Klein and Critical Social Theory: an account of politics, art and reason 
based on her psychoanalytic theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989). 
19 Epstein et al (this SI, 2018). 
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The first moment in love is that I do not wish to be an independent person 
in my own right and that, if I were, I would feel deficient and incomplete. 
The second moment is that I find myself in another person, that I gain 
recognition in this person, who in turn gains recognition in me. Love is 
therefore the most immense contradiction.20  
 
This is why recognition is precarious and challenging, and inevitably frustrated. 
Subjects are frequently too fragile to cope with such demanding tensions: the 
balance fails, recognition capsizes and misrecognition ensues. This is why 
misrecognition is such an enduring feature, even of the most robust and mature 
relationships. And given that, as both Hegel and Klein assert, subjectivity rests on 
the ability to recognise and be recognised by others, it explains why and how 
subjectivity comes under pressure, driving the continued search for ‘real 
recognition’. Selfhood rests on shaky foundations.  
 
There are two reasons for using Klein to read Hegel on recognition. The first is to 
help us understand Hegel more easily. Hegel can be difficult to grasp as his 
description of the person who has not yet achieved self-consciousness as 
‘abstract’ is abstract in itself. In Hegel’s dialectic, the ‘abstract’ only begins to 
construct itself through engagement with its ‘negative’ and is thus able to move 
                                                        
20 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, edited by 
Allen W. Wood, translated by H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991) p. 199. 
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towards the ‘concrete’.21 Klein, who used clinical work with individual patients 
to develop a theory of infant ego-development, is much more graphic in her 
description of the pre-conscious position as ‘schizoid-paranoid’ or fragmented. 
In this fragmented (for Hegel, abstract) state, a new-born is overwhelmed by 
instinctive drives and lacks the ability to organise, to construct herself as a 
coherent, thinking, acting being. The person is ‘in bits’, ruled by appetites, 
without an understanding of herself as separate from the things she experiences 
in the world around her. Through ‘reality-testing’ (Hegel’s struggles for 
recognition) with external objects in the outside world (Hegel’s negative), she 
begins to put her internal part-objects together. She begins to build an ego (self-
consciousness), which is a way to organise herself and mediate her engagement 
with the world around her. Klein gives us a description of the concrete 
experience of self-construction. 
 
Second, Klein’s more graphic account doesn’t just make Hegel more graspable; it 
gives us a way to understand how selfhood is constructed through 
misrecognition too – something he is less clear on. Klein understands different 
registers of engagement with the wider world. Some are rooted in idealisation, in 
which we engage with external objects we have created by projecting our own 
fragmented internal objects. We split these into purely good and bad objects as a 
way to enable us to defend against being overwhelmed by ourselves and our 
world. This world we create/encounter feeds omnipotence fantasies by 
                                                        
21 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Phenomenology of Sprit, translated by A. V. 
Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). 
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conforming to our inner world and appearing subject to our control. Our 
‘relationship’ to it is one of misrecognition because through it we maintain 
fantasies of independence and control. But other kinds of engagement emerge as 
our ego gains strength, and in these we glimpse more complex external others 
that begin to shape our own internal objects, forcing them to shift and adjust. We 
lose omnipotence; we realise mutual dependence; we allow ourselves to 
understand the world as separate and other. These more mature relationships 
are rooted in what Hegel calls recognition. 
 
I will not rehearse the reading of Hegel and misrecognition which is dealt with in 
detail elsewhere in this SI.22 But I will provide some more detail on Klein’s ideas, 
and attempt to show further how these can be read alongside Hegel to produce a 
way to see how misrecognition works in the formation of subjectivity.  
 
A Kleinian approach to misrecognition posits it as precursor, constitutive of, but 
also destructive of, recognition. The difference between recognition and 
misrecognition can be seen in the various ways infants and young children relate 
to the objects in the world around them. According to Klein, desires for oneness 
and separation originate in innate life and death instincts. In early life, these 
threaten to overwhelm the infant who is barely aware of herself as an entity, and 
unable to separate internal from external objects. As a defensive mechanism, the 
                                                        
22 Epstein et al (this SI, 2018); Epstein (this SI, 2018). 
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infant projects her desires onto external objects23 where they are experienced as 
completely separate from each other – a process Klein calls ‘splitting’.24 The 
world appears to be a collection of part objects, wholly defined by internal 
drives, and split in very idealised ways – wholly good and wholly bad. In these 
early stages of ego-formation, unbearable aggressive emotions are projected 
onto external objects in particularly violent ways. Klein argues that infants 
fantasise about tearing and biting objects into bits.25 At the same time, idealised 
‘good’ emotions are projected onto external objects which are experienced as 
perfectly loving. In this way, the infant creates an ideal world for itself in which 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ objects are experienced as completely separate – it is, Klein 
argues, a defence against the ‘paranoid-schizoid position’ of early life.26 
                                                        
23 Hegel says recognition is achieved through relations with objects (things) and 
subjects (people). Klein talks only of objects, but she means both things and 
people, and, as for Hegel, it is the latter that offer the best prospects for self-
realisation. This is because people push back. 
24 Melanie Klein, 'Notes on some Schizoid Mechanisms’, Envy and Gratitude and 
other works, 1946-1963 (London: Vintage, 1997a), pp. 1–24. 
25 Hanna Segal, Introduction to the Work of Melanie Klein (London: Karnac 
Books, 2006) 
26 Melanie Klein, ‘Love, Guilt and Reparation’, Love, Guilt and Reparation and 
other works, 1921-1945 (London: Vintage, 1998a), pp. 306–43. Klein’s depiction 
of the ‘good breast’ and ‘bad breast’ describes this fracturing of external objects, 
wherein the same object – here the mother – is sometimes experienced as wholly 
good and loving, and sometimes as wholly bad and destructive. Melanie Klein, 
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The misrecognition of external objects establishes a profound self-
misrecognition. The subject feels in command of itself and its world. In her 
article in this SI, Epstein discusses the ‘fantasy of sovereignty’ as described by 
Lacan in his exposition of the Mirror Stage in an infant’s life.27 As for Lacan, for 
Klein the fantasy is necessary to get a grip on the internal chaos the infant 
experiences. But ultimately it must be debunked if the infant is to begin to 
develop a more grounded ego rooted in acknowledgement of misrecognition and 
the move towards struggles for recognition – both of itself and the wider world. 
 
This comes about inevitably because the object relating works both ways. 
External objects encountered in the world are taken in (introjected) to help 
constitute the infant. This is the mechanism of object-relations, and the exchange 
of objects through projection and introjection is the basis for the gradual 
emergence of the ego.28 A trying out of our internally-shaped frameworks in the 
world, something like a constant assessment of the world within ready-made 
frames of reference, becomes a form of reality-testing.29 Their introjection 
                                                                                                                                                              
‘Envy and Gratitude’ in Envy and Gratitude and other works, 1946-1963 
(London: Vintage, 1997d), pp. 176–235. 
27 Epstein (this SI, 2018). 
28 Melanie Klein, 'On Identification' (1955), Envy and Gratitude and other works, 
1946-1963 (London: Vintage, 1997b), pp. 141–75. 
29 John Bowlby, Attachment and Loss (Volume Two): Separation, Anxiety and 
Anger (New York: Basic Books, 1973). 
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supports the internal objects, reinforcing a sense of their solidity.30 The 
interaction between introjection and projection ‘both builds up the internal 
world and shapes the picture of external reality’, and so the two are 
interdependent.31 As their egos emerge, people learn to recognise and 
acknowledge their own aggression and to engage with the world more 
reflectively. They begin to recognise ambiguity in it – that objects are both good 
and bad – reflecting and helping them build their own more complex internal 
objects. Here then we have a sense of progression from an early period of 
misrecognition, both of the external world and of the self, which gives way to 
possibilities of recognition as the ego emerges and strengthens. 
 
Splitting and projecting is not only a defensive mechanism, but a creative process 
without which selfhood cannot emerge. Winnicott (who trained under Klein) 
discusses it in terms of ‘playing’, the way in which we shape the world around 
our own fantasies. ‘It is in playing and only in playing that the individual child or 
adult is able to be creative and to use the whole personality, and it is only in 
being creative that the individual discovers the self’.32 Yet in this early stage of 
ego-development, recognition is a long way off, since the ‘other’ is essentially a 
creation of the self. Recognition really begins to emerge when we supplement 
                                                        
30 Klein (1997a). 
31 Klein (1997b), p. 141. 
32 Donald Winnicott, 'The use of an object and relating through 
identifications', Playing and Reality (London: Tavistock Publications, 1971), pp. 
86–94; p. 54. 
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play and fantasy in our engagement with the real world, when we allow our 
‘play’ objects to be tested by reality. This amounts to an acceptance that not only 
does the subject shape her objects, but the objects shape her. This stage is full of 
pain and stress because relinquishing the fantasy of omnipotence and the 
glamour of self-idealisation undoes where we thought we had got to with our 
selfhood. It becomes clear that what we recognised as ourselves in relation to 
our others was built on a fantasy. Klein describes this as the ‘depressive position’ 
in which the subject realises her weakness and her hatred for loved objects 
which are now accepted as part of whole, ambiguous objects. As the subject 
confronts the loss of the ideal and of her omnipotence, she experiences despair 
and loneliness.33  
 
The point to draw from this is that at the moment at which the ego is fragile, 
fantasy and ‘play’ are particularly crucial for the establishment of selfhood. It is 
only as the ego becomes stronger that a more painful engagement with the world 
on its terms is really possible. This suggests that early engagement with the 
world is necessarily dominated by forms of ‘misrecognition’, the tendency to see 
and shape the world in one’s own (also misrecognised) image, through processes 
of splitting and projecting. Misrecognition is thus a vital part of the emergence of 
selfhood, but ultimately it must also make room for a more troubling search for 
recognition through which we accept separation from and dependence on other 
subjects. However, we never leave misrecognition behind: Klein is clear that 
                                                        
33 Melanie Klein, 'On the sense of loneliness', Envy and Gratitude and other 
works 1946-1963 (London: Vintage, 1997c), pp. 300–13; p. 305. 
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defensive splitting mechanisms remain an important characteristic of 
relationships, particularly in times of anxiety.34 Indeed, given the instability of 
recognition itself, anxiety is never banished – Kristeva describes this as the 
inevitability of ‘psychic anxiety’.35 Because of this, misrecognition can be seen to 
be both a precursor to recognition, a component, and also a continual disturber 
of it.  
 
Scaling up: from infant to ‘infant-state’ 
The Klein-Hegel framework gives us a series of three steps which I am going to 
use to understand Ghana under Nkrumah. The first is the incoherence 
experienced at birth, and the overwhelming anxiety caused by the lack of an ego 
able to regulate internal chaos. The second is the creation of split objects, 
projected onto the world and encountered as external idealised objects, part of 
early attempts to establish selfhood. And the third is the breakdown of these 
objects under the encounter with substantial external objects that push back. 
This breakdown undermines selfhood premised on misrecognition but also lays 
the foundations for possibilities of recognition and a more robust selfhood. 
 
Before I do this I must address the tricky questions of scaling. How can I use 
ideas about the emergence of the individual’s ego to understand the creation of 
                                                        
34 Melanie Klein, ‘Mourning and its relation to manic-depressive states’ in Love, 
Guilt and Reparation and Other Works, 1921-1945 (London: Vintage, 1998b): 
344–69 
35 Julia Kristeva, Melanie Klein (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).  
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Ghana – something of a big jump? There are two problems here. The first is to 
treat African states as infants, at best patronising and at worst potentially 
playing into modernisation discourses that have described African countries as 
‘growing up’ to become more like European ‘adult’ or ‘developed’ states. And the 
second is IR’s perennial problem of translating ideas about individuals onto 
states. 
 
In relation to the first problem, there has been a powerful strand in thinking 
about the way African statehood emerged that talked about ‘growing up’ and 
‘maturing’ (many Africanists used such terms themselves around the time of 
independence and it was a major preoccupation of Nkrumah himself).36 Rostow’s 
modernisation model that was popular at the time understands the emergence of 
the new states in such terms and more recent ideas also set African states as 
‘behind’ on a trajectory of progress.37 These modernisation theses tend to see 
                                                        
36 Saburi Oladeni Biobaku, Secretary to the Premier, Western Region, Nigeria 
wrote: ‘We think it a matter of the highest priority to develop our people and our 
resources, to “modernize” in the phraseology of Professor Rostow; when we 
achieve this we shall invest the African personality with a potency that is bound 
to be respected everywhere, and our influence in the community of nations will 
be real, not superficial.’ Saburi Oladeni Biobaku, ‘Comments’ in American Society 
of African Culture (ed), Pan-Africanism Reconsidered (Berkley: University of 
California Press, 1962), pp. 129–32; p. 131. 
37 Walt Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (London: Cambridge University 
Press, 1962), and for a more recent example of this logic see Robert Cooper, The 
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states growing up by a process of adjusting to an external model through 
emulation. The ‘backward’ African condition is remedied through adoption of 
‘modern’ Western methods and norms. This is not how I understand the process 
of state self-realisation. According to my Hegel-Klein framing, emulation has 
nothing to do with the emergence of subjectivity, since with emulation the new 
‘subject’ remains dependent on its object, slavishly bound into copying it until it 
achieves sameness. For our purposes here, a dynamic struggle between wanting 
to be and rejecting the other lies at the heart of the emergence of subjectivity. 
The internal contradictions that imbue it make the process of ‘becoming’ 
provisional and cyclical at best. While I have suggested that there is a difference 
between misrecognition found in the paranoid-schizoid position and unstable 
recognition found in the depressive position, and I have even called the latter a 
‘mature’ form of relationship, I have been careful to point out that adults too 
respond to anxiety by employing strategies of misrecognition. For this approach, 
subjects continue to be formed through relationships throughout life – 
subjectivity is not a goal that has been achieved by some and still eludes others. 
Recognition can be seen as a driver of this process, something continuously 
pursued but never achieved.38 I therefore want to be very clear that when I talk 
about the idea of an ‘infant’ Ghanaian state and the ‘development’ of statehood, I 
do so within this understanding of relationships as dynamic, contested and 
unsettled, not a modernisation framing. Ghana here provides a way to explore 
                                                                                                                                                              
Breaking of Nations: Order and chaos in the twenty-first century (London: 
Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003). 
38 Gallagher (2017); Epstein et al (this SI, 2018). 
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processes of achieving state-subjectivity that all states experience and fail to 
experience. 
 
The second problem – about how to use ideas about individuals to understand 
states – is a perennial one for IR.39 There are various ways of addressing it. Hegel 
gives us a starting point, in his understanding of the dialectic being inherent at 
various levels – as Epstein et al point out, Hegel saw the master-slave dialectic 
within the individual, and between individuals, each mediating the other.40 
Already underpinning this discussion is the notion that interpersonal 
relationships resonate with internal psychic processes, an idea that Klein also 
explores explicitly in discussions about the relationships between objects.41 
Scaling up further one might point to work on the way groups underwrite 
individual subjectivity and wellbeing.42 The degree to which a group of which 
one is a member is able to assert itself and to elicit recognition in the world, is an 
essential source of individual stability and coherence. There is work on 
recognition in IR that already explores this – most notably Greenhill and 
Neumann who each discuss the ways in which one group’s relationship to other 
groups helps support its members’ sense of themselves as distinct from and 
                                                        
39 Alexander Wendt, ‘The State as a Person in International Theory’ Review of 
International Studies 30 (2004), pp. 289–316. 
40 Epstein et al (this SI, 2018). 
41 Klein (1998a) 
42 Wilfred Bion, Experiences in Groups and other Papers, (London: Tavistock 
Publications, 1974). 
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related to other groups through relationships of recognition.43 Group – or state – 
subjectivity emerges in this way, an idea explored for example in the struggle for 
recognition of minority groups.44  
 
A further way to address it might be to think about how individual leaders of 
groups embody and express the collective – how in their performance of it, they 
bring into being a collective consciousness. This is particularly apposite to 
understanding how post-colonial states become reified in their early years, as 
they rely heavily on their heads of state speaking and enacting statehood.45 
Nkrumah, like many post-independence leaders, took on a particularly important 
role in the absence of established state and broader institutions. In articulating 
and enacting what Ghana was, Nkrumah was able to birth his state's self-
consciousness by performing it.46 
                                                        
43 Greenhill (2008); Iver Neumann, Uses of the Other In World Politics 
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999). 
44 For an overview see Amy Gutman (ed), Multiculturalism: examining the 
politics of recognition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). 
45 Wallerstein, for example, argues that new states don’t have the ‘residual 
loyalty’ of citizens and need a dominant party and a charismatic leader to 
embody and enact unity. Immanuel Wallerstein (1961), Africa, the Politics of 
Independence (New York, Random House), p. 87. 
46 Apter describes Nkrumah acting as the 'nucleus of unity’ for Ghana as it 
attempted to create new institutions and abolish old ones. David Apter, Ghana in 
Transition (New York, Atheneum), p. 274. Kwaku Larbi Korang, in a fascinating 
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In exploring the words and deeds of its leader, I hope to explain the emergence 
of a new state. Most of the rest of the article discusses Nkrumah’s ideas from his 
key text, Africa Must Unite, published in 1963, a passionate and ‘most cogent’47 
call for pan-Africanism.48 As we have seen, Nkrumah described his powerful 
sense of Ghana as a ‘new entity’, a fragile, new-born state, at its independence. It 
might have been useful for Nkrumah to portray it in this way – to write off the 
pre-colonial history that he saw as rather backward and irrelevant to modern 
statehood, along with the legacies of a racist colonial state – but there was also 
undeniably a substantive issue of Ghana as a new country that had both to 
understand its new selfhood, and become an actor in the world – to achieve ‘self-
                                                                                                                                                              
discussion of Nkrumah’s depiction of his early life, shows how he portrayed 
himself as both embodiment and enabler of the emergence of Ghana as a ‘self-
nation in a universal modernity that still kept faith with its own nature’. Kwaku 
Larbi Korang, Writing Ghana, imagining Africa: nation and African modernity 
(Rochester: Rochester University Press, 2004). 
47 Ama Biney ‘The Legacy of Kwame Nkrumah in Retrospect’ The Journal of Pan 
African Studies 2:3, 2008, pp. 129-59, p. 136 
48 Nkrumah read widely and wrote prolifically during his time in power. 
Although some of his writing was achieved in collaboration and written by 
others, the ideas in his books were clearly his. On Nkrumah’s writings and 
thought, see: Biney (2011) and Immanuel Wallerstein ‘Implicit Ideology in 
Africa: a review of books by Kwame Nkrumah’ The Journal of Conflict Resolution 
11:4, 1967, pp. 518-22; p. 519.  
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consciousness’ and agency. Nkrumah describes this problem very clearly, and 
addresses it by weaving together the international and the domestic in an 
attempt to bring about a Ghanaian identity.  
 
A new African state 
Nkrumah published Africa must Unite in 1963, 11 years after he became prime 
minister under the transition from British rule, and six years after independence. 
This far into his rule and only three years from his own fall, one cannot help 
feeling that much of his description of domestic Ghana is built on an appreciation 
of the real mess the country was getting into,49 and reflects too the fact that 
Nkrumah was by this time quite obviously turning to international affairs for 
relief.50 In it, he describes the first years of a fragile new state. Nkrumah puts 
international relationships at the centre of his understanding of Ghanaian 
statehood. How far and in what ways these constitute relationships of 
recognition is a question I will come to later. In this section I discuss Nkrumah’s 
description of Ghana at independence and think through how far it might be 
characterised as ‘paranoid-schizoid’ or ‘pre-subjective’. 
 
                                                        
49 For a detailed account of Ghana’s decline under Nkrumah, see Roger Gocking, 
The History of Ghana (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2005). 
50 David Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah: the political kingdom in the Third World 
(London: I B Tauris, 1988). Nkrumah’s drive towards centralised control can also 
be read in the context of his increasingly narrow options in the face of economic 
crisis. Birmingham (1998). 
 25 
Nkrumah’s understanding of an infant Ghana emerges through descriptions of 
Ghanaians as immature and of Ghana as fractured and unintegrated. The 
language he uses paints Ghana as chaotic and schizoid. His main preoccupation is 
how to create a centralised state that can put it all together. I suggest that 
Nkrumah describes the state as the nation’s ego, emerging to contain and make 
sense of its messy incoherence. 
 
We have seen already how Nkrumah describes a ‘denuded’ state without 
‘bearings’.51 It was not only the removal of traces of colonial administration that 
created this ‘discontinuity’, but the powerful sense that Ghanaian people were 
themselves disconnected from the modern world, incapable of modern 
subjecthood. He wrote: 
 
Tribal society, counting little but sunrise, sunset and the moon’s apogee, 
welcomed these festive breaks in the monotony of passing days, and has 
carried over the customs to the present, where another more stirring 
philosophy needs to induce industriousness and thrift.52  
 
Unlike other African nationalist leaders (Julius Nyerere in Tanganyika, for 
example), he was not interested in restoring lost African virtues: here, he viewed 
                                                        
51 Nkrumah (1998) p. xiv. 
52 Nkrumah (1998) p. 105. 
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the modernisation of his subjects as essential.53 The people, he argues ‘have to be 
completely reanimated’.54 This idea of a death- or zombie-like state invokes an 
eerie, resonant emptiness. In Nkrumah’s description, the people are immersed, 
dream-like, in a pre-modern state of nature, mechanically rather than actively 
responsive to the rhythms of the moon and the sun, while Nkrumah himself 
appears to be the only one awake, bent on giving them consciousness.  
 
Ghana was of course not empty, and not without a history, not least in its colonial 
past. But this was an uncomfortable legacy. Elsewhere, Nkrumah describes it as 
leaving Ghanaians troubled and uncertain, disconnected from their roots, forced 
into copying an identity that was not theirs.55  
 
The country’s identity crisis was underlined by what Nkrumah saw as its internal 
fragmentation. This anxiety was not just Nkrumah’s: the idea of the new African 
countries in chaotic pieces was a favourite theme of academics and statesmen at 
                                                        
53 Nyerere writes of a natural African socialism and advocates its revival rather 
than a turn to Western forms. Julius K. Nyerere, Ujamaa: essays on socialism (Dar 
es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1968). Nkrumah was less emphatically anti-
tradition in some of his later work, arguing for a ‘scientific working out’ of 
traditional forms of African egalitarianism. Kwame Nkrumah, ‘African Socialism 
Revisited’ in Africa: National and Social Revolution (Prague: Peace and Socialism 
Publishers, 1967). 
54 Nkrumah (1998) p. 107. 
55 Kwame Nkrumah (1964). 
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the time. Zolberg described them as ‘syncretic’ and liable to violent fracture;56 
Marcum as fragmented into a ‘host of petty states’, threatened by internal 
‘centrifugal forces’ and ‘particularlist loyalties’;57 and later Mamdani called them 
‘bifurcated’, comprising members with entirely different conceptions of the state 
and their relation to it.58 It was generally assumed at African independence that 
the divisive legacies of colonialism, along with the stresses of containing ethnic 
pluralities within straightened economic circumstances, would put enormous 
strain on states with feeble capacities, and that division, conflict and 
fragmentation were inevitable. Such primordial forces presented the new states 
with a mess of contradictory drives that threatened to undo their ambitions to 
both represent and act for all the people – to establish a collective subject-hood.  
 
Nkrumah certainly appears to feel their challenge to state authority. He 
describes division as one of his biggest threats. The British he argues, had sewn 
the germs of disunity in their parting constitutional arrangements that enshrined 
a devolution of powers. These protected the power of regional chiefs who were 
bent on frustrating the government’s modernisation programme. The opposition 
                                                        
56 Aristide Zolberg, ‘The structure of political conflict in the new states of tropical 
Africa’ American Political Science Review LXII:1, 1968, pp. 70–87. 
57 John Marcum ‘Pan-Africanism: present and future’ in American Society of 
African Culture (ed) Pan-Africanism Reconsidered (Berkley: University of 
California Press, 1962), pp. 53-65; p. 53–4. 
58 Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: contemporary Africa and the legacy 
of later colonialism (London, James Currey, 1996). 
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parties, he believed, were ‘narrowly regional in concept, and often violent, 
abusive and terroristic in action’,59 the immature population ‘amenable to 
demagogic appeals and readily exploitable by eloquence that arouses the 
emotions rather than reason’.60 The ground, he says, ‘was well laid for the 
promotion of disunity and fragmentation’.61 He concludes: ‘We were engaged in a 
kind of war, a war against poverty and disease, against ignorance, against 
tribalism and disunity. We were fighting to construct.’62  
 
Nkrumah’s understanding of the role of the new state then was to turn a 
fragmented, chaotic and undeveloped country into a coherent whole. Here the 
state begins to look like the country’s fragile ego, attempting to establish stability 
and coherence in a struggle against confusion. And, much in the way Klein 
describes the work in this direction done by an individual’s fragile ego, 
coherence is constructed around a rigid, idealised sense of a unitary, omnipotent 
selfhood. Nkrumah set about his task by trying to establish a centralised 
economy and political system.63 ‘Our over-all planning,’ he writes, ‘will be 
                                                        
59 Nkrumah (1998) p. 68. 
60 Nkrumah (1998) p. 72. 
61 Nkrumah (1998) p. 62. 
62 Nkrumah (1998) p. 74. 
63 Maxwell Owusu, Uses and Abuses of Political Power: a case study of continuity 
and change in the politics of Ghana (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970). 
Here, Nkrumah was adopting the prevailing economic philosophy of the day – in 
Africa and beyond. A centralised economy focused on industrial growth, was the 
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designed to unify and discipline economic activity… Control from the top must 
ensure that individual executives and administrators do not misinterpret policy 
and instructions and break out of the co-ordinated pattern with the introduction 
of improvised schemes.’64 The result would be a country of complete unity, a 
country in which the ‘aspirations of the people and the economic and social 
objectives of the government are synonymous’65 while the trade unions’ aims are 
‘identified with those of the government’, something that ‘weds them to active 
participation in the carrying out of the government’s programme’.66 
 
On one level, this rhetoric was an attempt by Nkrumah to justify his moves to 
centralise power, to crack down on the opposition and media, and to ‘reform’ the 
power of the chiefs (‘crush’ might be a more appropriate word, according to 
Rathbone).67 Many African post-independence governments used such 
arguments to institute one-party states or to wage war against secessionist or 
dissatisfied factions. Yet from beneath the practical, materially-focused drive for 
unity, comes an anxiety that provides a different angle on Nkrumah’s rigid 
                                                                                                                                                              
norm in the 1960s and pursued by socialist and capitalist African regimes alike. 
See Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard (eds), International Development and 
the Social Sciences (Berkley: University of California Press, 1991). 
64 Nkrumah (1998) p. 122. 
65 Nkrumah (1998) p. 126. 
66 Nkrumah (1998) p. 126–7. 
67 Richard Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs: the politics of chieftancy in Ghana 
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insistence on conformity. Austin makes an interesting point that Nkrumah had 
an ‘extreme emotional attitude to power’, which he translated into an ‘Nkrumaist 
cult’. In this way he was able to portray his call for centralisation as a popular 
cause.68 Nkrumah paints a vivid picture of what a new-born state feels like – and 
the picture is a topsy-turvy one of internal fragmentation, alienation and dubious 
collective selfhood. He could describe the role of the state as the force that would 
pull it together, create the selfhood that would establish Ghana’s ‘dignity, 
progress and prosperity’.69 In such circumstances, a centralised state, with 
unambiguous objects and whose constituent parts worked harmoniously 
together, appears to protect against the anxieties both for the future of the 
country and those living in it. 
 
The allure of a heavily centralised state that could hold it all together went 
beyond elites. This was evidenced in Ghana in Nkrumah’s enormous electoral 
popularity in the early years,70 but it proved to be a feature of most newly-
emerging African states as they reached independence.71 Here we can point to 
                                                        
68 Dennis Austin (1964) Politics in Ghana 1946-1960 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press) p. 41. 
69 Nkrumah (1998) p. 221. 
70 Apter (1968). 
71 Dorman, for example, writes of a very similar tendency in Zimbabwe, 
achieving independence more than 20 years after Ghana, where a variety of civil 
society groups worked alongside the government to suppress division and 
dissent in the interests of the unity of the new nation. Sara Dorman, 
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Klein’s argument about the role of omnipotence fantasies in providing 
reassurance in the paranoid-schizoid state. Surrounded by anxiety and 
fragmentation, a firm central figure, utterly in control, provides a sense of 
stability, no matter how ephemeral and weakly rooted. Apter gives us a powerful 
sense of how Nkrumah used his charisma to contain anxiety: ‘For each group, 
Nkrumah could make things “all right”... His charisma became a vessel into which 
all authority flowed.’72 For Boateng, Nkrumah’s charismatic persona was built on 
implicit comparisons with Jesus.73  
 
Relationships with the wider world 
Here, I am going to discuss how Nkrumah achieved his picture of coherence and 
stability through his international relationships. This is a story in which the 
fantasy of internal consistence and control are played out in the wider world; 
idealised internal objects are split and projected onto external objects that now 
appear to conform to Nkrumah’s own certainties. 
 
The domestic scene in Ghana was, by 1963, far from coherent and stable and as 
Rooney puts it: ‘As local political problems mounted, the party apparatus 
                                                                                                                                                              
Understanding Zimbabwe: from liberation to authoritarianism (London: Hurst, 
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stressed [Nkrumah’s] role as a great African leader.’74 In other words, Nkrumah 
attempted to pull fractured Ghana together through his international policies. 
However, the enormous gap between domestic chaos and international fantasy 
could only be bridged through an adventurous creativity. Nkrumah was an 
enormously charismatic figure and an object of popular hero-worship, 
something that is both described and embodied in the work of his assistant and 
biographer June Milne.75 His vision of Ghana, which he frequently depicted 
through its international relationships, and most powerfully in his pursuit of a 
united Africa, highlights his huge talent for political vision and rhetoric. 
According to Wallerstein, this vision encapsulated an ideology shared across 
most of the African intelligentsia at the time.76  
 
We are looking at a fantasised Ghana constructed through misrecognition; of 
Ghana’s imagined friends and enemies, and how these ultimately feed back into 
Ghana’s sense of itself. The misrecognition of external objects is inseparable 
from a misrecognised self and this is because these external objects emerge from 
flattened idealised internal objects that have been split apart and projected in 
order to establish a sense of certainty and control. In Africa must Unite, Nkrumah 
argues for two types of relationship for African countries: those with the West, 
                                                        
74 Rooney (1988). 
75 June Milne, Kwame Nkrumah – a biography (London: Panaf, 2000) 
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and those with each other. These relationships are polarised – they are ‘split’ in 
Kleinian terminology: the first is with a dangerous and aggressive other, and the 
second is with an ideal non-other. These are unambiguous relationships offering 
a stark dichotomy of actors in Ghana’s wider world.77 
 
The relationship with the West – particularly the former colonial power – must 
be one of complete repudiation. Nkrumah wrote his book before Fanon’s work 
was translated into English,78 but he similarly traces ideas about the need to fight 
back (albeit non-violently) against colonial subjection in order to assert 
selfhood.79 In the economic sphere, African economies had been designed to 
                                                        
77 The argument that these were idealised by Nkrumah – that I make below – 
does not mean there was no substance to his perceptions of international friends 
and enemies. Ghana’s fragile economy was, like many other African economies, 
too small and too focused on its colonial dependence to have much hope of 
making it without substantial pan-African cooperation. Likewise, Nkrumah’s 
analysis of a malevolent West was rooted in the fact of Cold War anxieties and 
heavy-handed or illegal interventions in new states that were thought to be 
going the ‘wrong way’ ideologically. 
78 Franz Fanon’s book, Black Skin, White Masks was published in French in 1952, 
and in English in 1967. His, The Wretched of the Earth in French in 1961 and in 
English in 1963.  
79 Nkrumah was similar to Fanon in that he ‘advocated for a theory of 
decolonisation rooted in a dialectic of destruction and rebirth’. Ahlman (2017) p. 
11. 
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service European needs, and the world’s markets were stacked to maintain 
dependent relationships. Like many of his contemporaries, Nkrumah argues for 
self-sufficiency – autonomy – from the West if African states are to achieve 
economic viability. Politically, too, he argues against some of his Francophone 
colleagues who were entering independence while maintaining close ties to 
France.80 Such a state of affairs will not, he argues, deliver true independence to 
Africa. He sees a ‘Machiavellian danger’ in the Western powers,81 arguing that a 
total break with Europe is essential to help Africans establish material, 
ideological and emotional independence.  
 
The superpowers, he argues, are ‘seeking to make Africa a warground of 
contending interests’ and the Europeans, through the creation of trade zones, are 
‘planning our balkanization’.82 He warns against the lure of the European 
Development Fund.83 It is inadequate for the industrialisation needs of Africa, 
                                                        
80 The former French colonies were vigorously wooed by Charles de Gaulle. 
Nkrumah’s references to ‘balkanisation’ were made in answer to de Gaulle’s 
breaking up of French west Africa, and his plans to keep French-speaking 
colonies under close French patronage after independence. See Birmingham 
(1998). 
81 Nkrumah (1998) p. 193. 
82 Nkrumah (1998) p. 193. 
83 ‘Created in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome and launched in 1959, the European 
Development Fund (EDF) is the EU's main instrument for providing 
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and amounts to a ‘special plea for collective colonialism of a new order’.84 Better 
to create economic independence. Nkrumah’s greatest anxiety is that ‘the 
imperialist powers, fishing in the muddy waters of communalism, tribalism and 
sectional interests, endeavour to create fissions in the national front, in order to 
achieve fragmentation’.85 The danger of engagement with the West, therefore, is 
one of exacerbated internal fracture and division.  
 
In this, Nkrumah presents a clear connection between disruptive division 
internally – bad internal objects – and disruptive external forces – bad external 
objects. He links these objects together as a way to explain, and jettison, messy 
ambiguity at home: it is now all identified with a malevolent West. Ghana, and all 
Africa, can only clear the ‘muddy waters’ by cutting itself off. The mud itself is 
dissipated through this projection: stuck now to the West, it can be seen more 
clearly and apparently dealt with more straightforwardly. Nkrumah’s fantasy of 
complete autonomy from the West rang hollow, as we shall see later. But as a 
signifier of the sense of control and independent statehood it was exemplary. 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
development aid to African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and to 
overseas countries and territories (OCTs).’ 
(www.ec.europa.eu/europeaid/funding/funding-instruments-
programming/funding-instruments/european-development-fund_en – cited 15 
February 2017). 
84 Nkrumah (1998) p. 160. 
85 Nkrumah (1998) p. 173. 
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But equally important for Nkrumah, and the cause around which he constructed 
a powerful idealisation, was a completely different type of relationship, 
embodied in the idea of pan-Africanism.86 Here, instead of a relationship of total 
rejection, we see a relationship of complete submersion, in which Ghana is part 
of ‘a glorious tree of union and brotherhood among the peoples of Africa’.87  
 
Pan-Africanism as an intellectual tradition began in the African-American and 
Caribbean diaspora in the early 20th century, and focused on the idea of a 
reclamation of African identity for people who had been uprooted and deprived 
of selfhood. Edward Blyden’s ‘Back to Black’, an early articulation, expressed the 
idea of an essential common African identity ‘forged in the common experience 
of racism’.88 According to Raymond Suttner, other pan-Africanists looked further 
back, proposing that the ‘oneness’ amongst all people of African descent, related 
‘to the alleged intrinsic character of the African spirit… based on an “imaginary 
consensus” that is claimed to have prevailed in Africa prior to conquest’.89 This 
                                                        
86 Gocking (2005). 
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idea was embodied in the ‘African personality’ that Africans had been deprived 
of through slavery and colonialism.90 It was sometimes equated with African 
philosophies about the individual’s embeddedness in the whole: ‘Man become 
integral parts of one other (sic). The group, no longer a collection of entities, is 
substantively interrelated.’91 Africans’ ‘return’ was often literal too – Marcus 
Garvey, whose influence was at its height in the 1920s and 1930s, advocated the 
‘Back to Africa’ movement, promoted through the practical means of the Black 
Star Shipping Company which he helped establish. African-Americans could 
‘return home’ to Liberia and Ethiopia (the uncolonised parts of Africa at the 
time).  
 
From America and the Caribbean, no doubt, for people whose ancestors had 
been violently removed from their context, Africa could look like an 
undifferentiated mass. Blackness and an origin in Africa were what united the 
proponents of pan-Africanism. ‘Africa’ was a fantasy homeland, an ideal 
alternative to the violent and unwelcoming Americas. Nkrumah and other 
nationalist African leaders who studied in the US and Europe in the 1940s and 
1950s engaged with these ideas – perhaps also seeing ‘Africa’ in a new light from 
the position of a homesick migrant. The idea also provided them with a powerful 
                                                        
90 Alioune Diop, ‘Remarks on African personality and negritude’, American 
Society of African Culture (ed) Pan-Africanism Reconsidered (Berkley: University 
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ideological and political objective, a ‘club’ enabling ‘intimate interaction and 
collaboration’.92 Nkrumah became heavily involved in the pan-African movement 
in London.93 He came to believe that real independence for African countries was 
impossible without continental political union. He saw himself, the leader of the 
first African country to achieve independence, at the forefront of this campaign 
moving, he hoped, towards a United States of Africa. Copies of Africa must Unite 
were handed out to delegates at the meeting to establish the Organisation of 
African Unity (OAU) in Addis Adaba in 1963 ‘in the hope that any members who 
were not yet convinced of the need for unification would absorb the 
overwhelming case for unity by reading the book’.94 
 
Nkrumah’s book is saturated with the themes of African ‘oneness’ and ‘African 
personality’. When he talks about his relationships with other African leaders, he 
is describing a meeting of minds and ideas, far more than in his descriptions of 
domestic relationships. Like the pan-Africanist Americans, he appears to find his 
‘home’ in ‘Africa’. 
 
In meeting fellow Africans from all parts of the continent I am constantly 
impressed by how much we have in common. It is not just our colonial past, 
                                                        
92 Apter and Coleman (1962), pp. 88–9. 
93 Nkrumah was one of the main organisers of the fifth Pan-African Congress in 
Manchester in 1945: see Hakim Adi and Marika Sherwood, The 1945 Manchester 
Pan-African Congress Revisited (London: New Beacon Books, 1995). 
94 Milne (2000) p. 96. 
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or the fact that we have aims in common, it is something which goes far 
deeper. I can best describe it as a sense of one-ness in that we are 
Africans.95  
 
As other African states gained independence, Nkrumah began to work for African 
union. With his closest allies Guinea and Mali he formed the ‘nucleus of the 
United States of Africa’ in 1960, exchanging cabinet ministers with Guinea, and 
working on the principles of pan-Africanism that would harmonise foreign, 
defence and economic policy and work towards the ‘rehabilitation and 
development of African culture’.96 The practical objectives of these policies, 
designed to bring about ‘unalloyed unity’,97 would be to eradicate economic 
competition and pool resources.  
 
Nkrumah thus translated his desire for Ghanaian unity and harmony onto the 
whole continent. His idealised coherent internal object had a corresponding 
idealised coherent external object to relate to. With delight he describes how 
‘[o]ur conferences have been characterized by an identity of view on most of the 
problems examined and an atmosphere of perfect understanding’.98 He writes: 
 
                                                        
95 Nkrumah (1998) p. 132. 
96 Nkrumah (1998) p. 142. 
97 Nkrumah (1998) p. 185. 
98 Nkrumah (1998) p. 143. 
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To us, Africa with its islands is just one Africa. We reject the idea of any 
kind of partition. From Tangier or Cairo in the North to Capetown in the 
South, from Cape Guardafui in the East to Cape Verde Islands in the West, 
Africa is one and indivisible.99 
 
The realisation of these plans will, he believes, eliminate ‘those acquisitive 
tendencies which lead to sectional conflicts within society’,100 and in time be 
translated onto the wider international stage: 
 
[A]ll Africa will speak with one concerted voice. With union, our example of 
a multiple of peoples living and working for mutual development in amity 
and peace will point the way for the smashing of the inter-territorial 
barriers existing elsewhere, and give a new meaning to the concept of 
human brotherhood. A Union of African States will raise the dignity of 
Africa and strengthen its impact on world affairs. It will make possible the 
full expression of the African personality.101 
 
Nkrumah is describing the seamless submersion of Ghana into the larger entity 
of Africa. He extends his ideas about harmony and unity within Ghana to a 
harmony and unity across the continent, whereby every African can feel a 
complete oneness with every other African and on this larger stage, he feels he 
                                                        
99 Nkrumah (1998) p. 217. 
100 Nkrumah (1998) p. 171. 
101 Nkrumah (1998) p. 193. 
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has found it, far more easily than he is managing at home. This is a description of 
Hegel’s idea of the desire for complete ‘oneness’ with the other. It is also an 
idealised projective identification which posits an Africa entirely shaped in 
imagination, one that presents no sense of disturbing difference, but one too that 
can apparently represent the united homogenous Ghana he is trying to bring into 
being. 
 
Ghanaian statehood, coherent, unified and acting, emerges in Nkrumah’s 
conceptualisation as resting on a complete repudiation of a violent aggressive 
other; and a complete submersion into an idealised other which is so closely 
identified with as to cease being properly other. Nkrumah captured the 
uncertainty of the fragile new state in the way he juxtaposes it in relation to 
these two extremes which, in Kleinian fashion, represent split internal objects, 
projected onto idealised good and bad external objects. But he has also managed 
to contain it, to pitch it as ‘concrete’ amidst this array of polarised certainties. 
 
The outside world he has created, built on fantasies of omnipotence, autonomy, 
control and perfection is clearly misrecognised. Just as the relationships at home 
are deeply fractured and fraught, so Ghana’s international relationships were 
more ambiguous. But these fantasies were I think necessary for the fledgling 
state. They enabled it to begin to explain itself, both to itself and to the wider 
world, to establish an illusion of agency through its ideas about what it was and 
its ability to act. Nkrumah’s self-idealisation, linked to these idealised external 
objects, also established a profound self-misrecognition of Ghana – as important, 
as capable, as powerful. This all came crashing down around him in a few short 
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years, and yet it had set Ghana on the path towards more grounded forms of 
recognition. 
 
Misrecognition, recognition and state-making 
Nkrumah’s international relationships were not based on recognition which, as 
Hegel and Klein suggest, is rooted in a relation with ambiguity. I want to show 
now how this misrecognition disintegrated and laid the foundations for more 
solid forms of recognition and grounded selfhood. 
 
Nkrumah’s fall was brutal, and hugely popular in Ghana. The announcement of 
the coup that ousted him in 1966 was greeted with widespread celebration and 
he died in exile in 1972.102 There are many accounts of Nkrumah’s fall and its 
causes – domestic and international. Nkrumah himself wrote: ‘The incident in 
Ghana is a plot by the imperialists, neo-colonialists and their agents in Africa’.103 
Hadjor argues that Nkrumah ‘kept popular support but was brought down by 
                                                        
102 Apter writes of ‘rejoicing in the streets’ at the news of the coup (1968, p. 787) 
and how ‘women chalked their faces and wore white in the villages – traditional 
symbols of rejoicing’ (1968, p. 767). Gocking writes: ‘The coup itself was 
welcomed in Ghana with far more enthusiasm than had been the case for 
independence… The bars were jammed with celebrants the night after the coup.’ 
Gocking (2005) p. 138. For a detailed account of the key actors involved in the 
coup, see Simon Baynham, The Military and Politics in Nkrumah’s Ghana 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1988). 
103 Kwame Nkrumah, Dark Days in Ghana (London: Panaf Books, 1968), p. 44. 
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selfish party members’ in a ‘CIA-backed army coup’104 and Milne argued that the 
coup was a creation of ‘reactionary forces’.105 These fit into Nkrumah’s broader 
depiction of the West as the enemy of Ghana, and while there is truth in the 
assertion that the West was interested in his fall, there is scant evidence that the 
British or Americans were directly involved in the 1966 coup.106  
 
Other accounts are more nuanced, situating Nkrumah’s dramatic fall from grace 
within his political failures at home. Feit writes that it was Nkrumah’s failure to 
make the state into a Leviathan capable of containing the divisions and 
                                                        
104 Kofi Buenor Hadjor Nkrumah and Ghana: the dilemma of post-colonial power 
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actually set the coup in motion or take part’. Rooney (1988) p. 254. They didn’t 
need to. As others have pointed out, the coup didn’t need external direction: 
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alternative power sources that caused the problems. He was easily put aside; his 
regime was ‘little more than [a] shadow’.107 Owusu argues that Nkrumah’s 
credibility rested on his ability to deliver the economic growth he had promised, 
and that as this failed to emerge, he faced overwhelming political pressure.108 By 
1963 it was clear that despite huge efforts, the economy was in terrible shape. 
Nkrumah’s ambitious and expensive industrialisation projects, designed to 
overcome Ghana’s dependence on cocoa exports, were struggling, goods were 
scarce, unemployment and prices were rising, and there was a severe balance of 
payments crisis.109 
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In his novel The Beautyful Ones are not yet Born the Ghanaian novelist Ayi Kwei 
Armah, a critic of the regime, provides a moving account of the rapid decline of 
Ghana’s economy under Nkrumah, illustrating the depression that gripped the 
country by the mid-1960s.110 Economic crisis caused by the crippling constraints 
created by foreign interests and economic mismanagement coupled with rising 
unpopularity created by Nkrumah’s repressive domestic measures to curb union 
discontent and clamp down on dissidents spread a film of decay and corruption. 
Armah’s novel shows the dramatic change from the elation he inspired in his 
early speeches, to the quiet despair that emerged later. The novel opens with a 
description of zombie-like commuters stumbling their way to work in the dark 
through a city strewn with detritus and decay. Armah turns Nkrumah’s idea of 
animating Ghanaians upside-down, suggesting he turned them into hapless 
sleepwalkers. 
 
According to Birmingham, it was the increasing disconnect between such 
disturbing domestic realities and the pan-African dream that caused Nkrumah’s 
                                                                                                                                                              
broader account of the various causes of economic decline, despite the huge 
investment of his government’s ‘big push’, see Tony Killick, Development 
Economics in Action: a study of the economic policies in Ghana (London: 
Heinemann, 1978). 
110 Ayi Kwei Armah The Beautyful Ones are not yet Born (London: Heinneman, 
1969) 
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unpopularity.111 He was forced to defend his generous financial support for 
impoverished Guinea, which had even more emphatically cast off European 
patronage112 while Ghanaians themselves struggled with economic hardship. His 
deployment of troops in Congo in 1960 to support the besieged regime there 
showed up the inadequacies of Ghana’s military capacity and led to the 
humiliation of its officers. A lavish banquet thrown in Accra for visiting heads of 
state in 1965 to promote pan-Africanism was a ‘disaster’, creating the 
impression of a leader oblivious to suffering and poverty at home, and a failure 
in terms of objectives of closer international cooperation. The last straw for 
military leaders was Nkrumah’s plan to deploy troops in Rhodesia at the 
Universal Declaration of Independence in 1965: unable to stomach more badly-
planned foreign adventures, the officers acted. ‘Pan-African idealism brought 
Nkrumah’s final ruin’, says Birmingham.113 
 
Pan-Africanism – like the repudiation of the West – had always been a fantasy. 
Nkrumah’s first pan-Africa meeting in Accra in 1957 had been an ‘electrifying 
gathering’, but from 1960, when other African countries began to achieve 
independence, differences with Nkrumah’s vision began to emerge.114  
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Dissent from the ‘gradualists’,115 grew among most of the Francophone countries 
which were keen to keep ties with their former colonial power (Leopold Senghor 
of Senegal and Houphouet Boigny of Cote d’Ivoire, for example, were happy to 
maintain French trade links, currency and education systems alongside powerful 
emotional attachments),116 and from leaders who were suspicious of his 
tendency to assume leadership of the continent, and who jealously guarded their 
own sovereignty.117 Even in his relations with his closest ally Guinea, attempts to 
pool sovereignty were undermined by the fact that ‘the two countries had no 
common border, no common language, no common traditions of administration, 
of defense, of policing, or of foreign relations’118 as well as ‘differing external 
commitments, and rival political ambitions’.119 
 
The relationship with the West was far more complicated too. Nkrumah 
remained deeply ambivalent towards the West, harbouring an admiration for 
Britain and a ‘love-hate’ relationship with America. After a painful debate, he 
pragmatically accepted English as the language of the state because it was the 
best way to overcome competition between Ghana’s many indigenous languages 
and from the start he viewed Western investment as essential for his 
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modernisation programme.120 He rejected the queen as head of state in 1960, yet 
remained fascinated by her, seeing her as a ‘fairy godmother’ figure.121 And of 
course, Nkrumah’s ardent advocacy of modernisation and industrialisation was 
rooted in his desire to emulate Western economic success. 
 
Reading Africa must Unite alongside contemporary accounts of Ghana like 
Armah’s, one is contemplating a picture of Nkrumah entering into an 
increasingly detached and frenzied insistence on his idealised view of the wider 
world, while his compatriots experience their country gently rotting away. This 
divergence suggests a growing perception of the mismatch between Nkrumah’s 
misrecognised international relationships and the fantasy Ghana he had built on 
top of them. Misrecognition had reached its limits, as reality testing increasingly 
broke down clear-cut categories. In Armah’s description of miserable decay, we 
see Ghanaians struggling with a Kleinian ‘depressive position’, far more aware of 
their own fragility and state of muddle than their leader whose continued 
pursuit of fantasy relationships became increasingly manic. 
 
When Colonel E. K. Kotoka announced the removal of Nkrumah’s government on 
Ghana Radio on the morning of the coup he said: ‘The myth surrounding 
Nkrumah has been broken.’122 Apter noted that the country felt ‘provincial and 
quiet after Nkrumah, the problems now being confronted as local but real, where 
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before they were grandiose and unreal’. Politics were now about ’the practical 
and the mundane’ rather than ’the drama and the opportunity presented by 
radical politics’.123 Nkrumah took glamour, fantasy and ideas of greatness with 
him.  
 
Ghanaians now had to engage in relationships with much more ambiguous 
others upon which they both depended and from which they differed – these 
would assume relationships grounded in struggles for recognition, anchored in 
more complex object-relations. The attempts to repudiate the West gave way to 
more calculated overtures wherein a succession of military leaders attempted to 
cultivate lucrative relationships, until one of them, Jerry Rawlings, threw his lot 
entirely in with the Washington Institutions in the 1980s, in his bid to fix the 
country’s troubled economy.124 Relationships with other African countries could 
not be idealised anymore either. Pan-Africanism was not realised in the form 
that Nkrumah hoped for. He worried in 1963 that ‘in the early flush of 
independence, some of the new African states are jealous of their sovereignty 
and tend to exaggerate their separatism’.125 As Africa’s new states began to take 
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shape, they did prefer to make themselves into separate entities. The African 
Union, successor to the Organisation of African Union that Nkrumah helped 
establish, continues to frustrate advocates of pan-Africanism. Tim Murithi begins 
his analysis of ‘The African Union at Ten’: ‘As the African Union marked its tenth 
anniversary on 9 July 2012, it was still recovering from one of its most public 
disagreements.’126 The organisation remains, he writes, 'at its core, a disparate 
collection of nation states’.127 
 
This seems to me to be a good description of ‘a relational dynamic of mutual 
constitution: the subject contributes to shape the object and the object allows the 
self to “cognize” itself in it’.128 Nkrumah himself could not apparently grasp a 
Ghana ‘immersed in the messiness of life’,129 but ultimately, by bringing Ghana 
into being through misrecognition, he enabled it to develop the self-
consciousness with which to begin to do so.  
 
Practically, the AU has continued to help shape African states into viable entities. 
Pan-Africanism remains an underlying ideal – a creative fantasy – while the 
hammering out of compromise between competing interests at the AU – bumpy, 
conflictual, irritable – looks more like struggles for recognition. The power of 
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Nkrumah’s idealised misrecognition is constantly revived by his admirers – and 
there are many of them in recent years as his reputation as a bold, visionary 
African leader has been rehabilitated.130 Perhaps he, like anything, is easier to 
idealise from a distance. The combination of these levels is a story of 
misrecognition – ideas of others that are based on fantasy, copies of internal 
objects – and flashes of recognition, seen in the more grounded, underlying grasp 
of others as fuller, more complex and ambiguous objects. Misrecognition in the 
early years, but an underlying and emerging recognition too: both are part of the 
creation of Ghana’s statehood. 
 
Conclusion 
Like other contributors to this SI, I have argued that states achieve subjectivity 
through struggles for recognition. But my particular argument has been that 
misrecognition both protects against these struggles and enables, or even drives 
the pursuit of them. Misrecognition’s protective capacity can be found in many 
other instances of bellicose posturing and populist leadership that projects a 
world of apparent certainty within which fantasies of omnipotence can flourish, 
from Mugabe to Brexit to Putin. Misrecognition is not just the preserve of ‘infant 
states’.  
 
                                                        
130 Nkrumah was voted Africa’s ‘Man of the Millennium' in a BBC World Service 
Poll in 1999 
(http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/people/highlights/000914_nkrumah.shtm
l, cited 8 March 2018). 
 52 
However, when it comes to an ‘infant state’ like Ghana was in 1957, omnipotence 
fantasies protect against the acute anxieties raised in a ‘paranoid-schizoid’ 
position. Thompson points out that Ghana managed to portray itself as a heavy-
weight world player in its early years.131 This was only possible because it was 
led by a man of enormous imagination who could encapsulate and project the 
fantasies of his new country. He made ‘being Ghana’ possible in the early years 
because he created a vivid and persuasive fantasy. The Ghana he enabled, built 
on fantasy, crumbled beneath him, and its collapse drove a new kind of 
engagement with the wider world, built on a struggle for recognition, that 
enabled the emergence of a more ambiguous but ultimately more solid statehood 
– the realization that selfhood rests on the inevitable tension between wanting to 
be and wanting to be separate from, external objects. This, I suggest, is why the 
Ghanaian state achieved as a product of Nkrumah’s pan-African ideal, rather 
than in spite of it. 
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